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Collusion in International Organizations:
How States Benefit from the
Authority of Secretariats
 
Hylke Dijkstra
In the theoretical literature on the authority of international secretariats, ac-
ademics often dichotomize between states and secretariats. Even when they
account for the fact that states are often divided, they normally adopt a two-
step approach: states first resolve their own differences before they entertain
relations with secretariats. This article provides an alternative perspective. It
argues that individual or groups of states may collude with like-minded sec-
retariats to achieve outcomes at the expense of other states. Working in-
formally together is beneficial. States can benefit from the rational-legal,
delegated, moral, and expert authority of secretariats. States and secretariats
can also exchange resources. The article illustrates this perspective through
two case studies: the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 and the European
Union’s military operation in Chad in 2008. KEYWORDS: international secretari-
ats, authority, principal-agent model.
THE AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIATS HAS BECOME A MAJOR TOPIC
in the discipline of international relations.1 From Jacques Delors at the helm of
the European Commission to the technical expertise of officials in the World
Health Organization (WHO), academics have shown how nonstate actors make a
difference. When analyzing the authority of secretariats, they often dichotomize
between states and secretariats: authority comes at the expense of the member
states. This dichotomy is inherent in the theories used. Constructivists want to
make a point about the independent contribution of nonstate actors. Principal-
agent scholars, by the nature of their model, distinguish between “principals” and
“agents.” They also tend to focus on the formal rules, in which the member states
are normally treated as a collectivity. 
In this article, I provide an alternative theoretical perspective. I argue that
individual or groups of states team up with secretariats to achieve outcomes at
the expense of other states. First, secretariats can be powerful allies for states
due to their multiple sources of authority.2 Second, secretariats rarely have suf-
ficient powers to ignore the interests of states. They normally need the support
of a substantial number of states. Collusion between like-minded states and
secretariats is a logical outcome. While collusion is informal, it includes a
range of activities such as jointly confronting other states, precooking meet-
ings, discussing strategies, and exchanging resources.
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Member states are often divided and this affects the authority of secretari-
ats. Many scholars have focused on the “preference heterogeneity” between
states and what this means for secretariats.3 The literature, however, almost ex-
clusively focuses on the initial delegation phase and assumes a “collective prin-
cipal.” That is, member states first solve their differences before they delegate
functions. After delegation, however, the policy dynamics are different. Author-
ity will depend on the ability of secretariats to work with like-minded states.4
Collusion is particularly likely to take place under three conditions: states and
secretariats have complementary resources, they share preferences, and the risk
of a loss of reputation is small for the secretariat.
In the article, I provide empirical evidence from two case studies: the inter-
vention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Libya in 2011 and
the European Union (EU) military operation in Chad and the Central African
Republic in 2008. While military intervention is an area where the role of sec-
retariats is assumed to be limited, it is also domain where the capabilities of the
member states differ significantly. We would thus expect key states to take the
lead and work informally with the secretariat. This is precisely in line with the
empirical evidence. Both secretariats pursued their own agendas in cooperation
with key member states. They made use of their procedural advantages. Collu-
sion took the form of private meetings and the exchange of staff.
I first discuss how conflict between states affects the authority of secre-
tariats. I subsequently provide a new perspective by outlining how states and
secretariats work together when making actual policy. I trace empirically
NATO and EU planning, and point at key instances of collusion. These case
studies should not be seen as a test of the theory, but rather as providing suf-
ficient evidence of its plausibility as well as examples of how collusion works
in practice.
Divided States and the Authority of Secretariats
In this article, I provide a new perspective on the authority of international sec-
retariats. I start from the assumption that secretariats are not just the tools of
states, but can be actors in their own right.5 As actors, they can decide to col-
lude with member states to reach common objectives. Collusion in interna-
tional organizations is defined as an informal agreement between two or more
actors, normally defying the formal rules, with the purpose of coordinating be-
havior to reach commonly agreed objectives.6 I develop three conditions under
which we are likely to see instances of collusion. First, states and secretariats
have complementary resources. Second, they have similar preferences. Third,
the risk of a loss of reputation for the secretariat is relatively low. Before out-
lining the argument, I discuss the current theoretical literature.
The theoretical literature on authority often pits secretariats against
states.7 States collectively delegate tasks to secretariats. Secretariats pursue
their own agendas. States sanction secretariats when they detect agency loss.
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The dichotomy is explicit in principal-agent models, but also implicit in
many nonstate accounts of authority. It is useful to provide an overview of the
existing propositions on divided states. The starting point is the conceptual
distinction between a “collective principal” and “multiple principals.”8 We
speak of a collective principal when the member states collectively interact
with an agent. In the case of multiple principals, member states also unilater-
ally interact with the agent. Member states in the collective principal first have
to go into conclave before they can reach out to the secretariat. In the case of
multiple principals, there is no need for interstate agreement. Principals may
actually be in competition with each other. Figure 1 shows the three types of
principal-agent relations. 
According to Mona Lynn, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney, “Collective
principals are overwhelmingly the most common type of principal that we
observe when analyzing IOs [international organizations].”9 This is formally
correct yet ignores the anarchical state of international relations, incomplete
contracting, and informal politics.10 States also vary in their ability to lobby
and control secretariats.11 It is thus necessary to develop alternative proposi-
tions on how conflict between member states plays out. Many scholars are
concerned with how conflict between states affects institutional design. States
negotiate among themselves about whether to create an agent and delegate
tasks. The perspective of a collective principal is appropriate.12 Following
David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran,13 Darren Hawkins et al. note that “del-
egation typically requires states to resolve their policy conflicts before they
can decide to grant conditional authority to an agent . . . [t]he greater the pref-
erence heterogeneity . . . the less likely they will be to delegate to an IO.”14
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Figure 1  Single, Collective, and Multiple Principals
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Sources: Based on Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney, “Delegation to International Organi-
zations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform,” International Organization 57,
no. 2 (2003): 248; Mona Lynn, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney, “A Problem of Principals:
Common Agency and Social Lending at the Multilateral Development Banks,” in Darren
Hawkins, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney, eds., Delegation and Agency in In-
ternational Organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 45.
Other scholars provide a different story. They point at the absence of hierar-
chy and the need for credible commitments.15 Precisely when the member
states are divided, they need an agent to adjudicate. 
In this article I address instead what happens after delegation, where the
distinction between the collective principal and multiple principals becomes
relevant. Scholars in the former tradition point at the decisionmaking rules. In
some international organizations, where secretariats have formal powers such
as the exclusive right of initiative (e.g., EU or International Monetary Fund
[IMF]) or where it is easier for the member states to adopt than to amend a pro-
posal, secretariats can exploit divisions among states.16 Scholars furthermore
note that a large zone of possible agreement allows secretariats to propose ini-
tiatives with a bias toward their own goals.17
The multiple principals perspective provides a different view. Individual
states or groups of states will try to act through secretariats to achieve outcomes
close to their individual preferences.18 Johannes Urpelainen has proposed a
model in which states compete for control over the resources of secretariats.19
By lobbying secretariats, states try to affect secretariat preferences and redirect
some secretariat authority toward their own interests.20 Scholars note that states
value having their own nationals in key positions in secretariats.21 The idea of
unilateral influence is attractive since it adds an informal dimension. Yet there
is a tension. States will try to influence a secretariat only if it has significant au-
thority. But authoritative secretariats are the most difficult to influence. Nitsan
Chorev, for instance, shows how the WHO staff fend off pressures from the
Global North and Global South.22 The unilateral influence agenda dismisses
secretariat authority, but logically requires it.
In this article I build on these perspectives, but treat secretariats as actors in
their own right rather than as instruments of the powerful member states. As ac-
tors, they can decide to collude with member states to reach common objectives.
Rather than sitting opposite to the member states, secretariats sit among them
when policy is made. Secretariats might be short on formal powers, but they
make up for it through other forms of authority.23 Secretariats may not be the pri-
mary actors in international organizations, but they still can lend weight to like-
minded member states. While collusion is almost always informal, it may involve
precooked meetings and joint negotiations strategies as well as the exchange of
resources. It is useful, in this respect, to define several scope conditions.
The first condition is that collusion between states and secretariats re-
quires complementary resources. When states and secretariats combine those
resources, they stand a better chance of achieving their preferred policy out-
comes. Secretariats often possess rational-legal, delegated, moral, and expert
authority,24 precisely because the member states do not.25 States have out-
sourced tasks resulting in a division of labor26 or they do not have authority to
speak for the international community.27 Some secretariats thus possess key
resources. This gives states incentives to work with secretariats. Similarly, sec-
retariats are not able to achieve much without the support of member states.
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Complementary resources are therefore critically important. If secretariats are
weak, there is no reason for states to work with them.
The second condition is that states and secretariats collude when they
have similar preferences. While the literature on member state coalitions lists
various reasons for cooperation,28 there is reason to treat this literature with
caution. When states act through groups or coalitions, their rationale may be
to reduce negotiation complexity (negotiations with too many actors is not
practical) or to gather a voting majority. Collusion between states and secre-
tariats serves neither purpose. Collusion is therefore more likely based on pref-
erence affinity: states and secretariats will work together only when they agree
on an issue. Collusion is thus likely issue dependent.
The third condition is that collusion should not put the reputation of secre-
tariats excessively at risk. Indeed, collusion between states and secretariats dif-
fers from the coordination behavior between states. Most secretariats have to be
impartial as a result of their formal mandate. Collusion between states and sec-
retariats thus cannot be as explicit as coordination between states. It is likely to
be informal, tacit, and secretive. When a secretariat openly backs a member
state, it might lose its (perceived) neutrality, its authority, and therefore its
added value. This puts limits on collusion. Collusion therefore takes place when
the benefits outweigh the risk of damage to the secretariat’s reputation. 
In addition to these three conditions, we need to consider when collusion
takes place. There are opportunities throughout the policy process. Agenda-
setting scholars have suggested that conflict expansion—to enlarge the group
of involved actors with supporters—is a strategy to put pressure on opposing
actors.29 If the secretariat is on board, this might convince some other member
states as well. Secretariats also often have procedural powers. During decision-
making, the secretariat’s authority often depends on its information advantage
versus the opposing member states. Such an advantage allows it to construct
policy alternatives and misrepresent the consequences of those alternatives.30
Rather than relying on its own resources, the secretariat can increase its infor-
mation advantage by exchanging information with like-minded states. Finally,
during implementation, secretariats often benefit from support and buy-in by
the member states. States can also shield secretariats from ex post sanctions.
To sum up the argument: the member states are often divided on policy.
To achieve their preferences, individual or groups of member states may team
up with the secretariat. Secretariats also have incentives to work with like-
minded states. This idea of collusion challenges the conventional wisdom in
the theoretical literature that the authority of secretariats comes at the expense
of the membership. It also challenges the dichotomy between states and sec-
retariats. The authority of secretariats benefits some states and it hurts others.
There are three conditions for collusion to occur. First, states and secretariats
need to have complementary resources. Second, states and secretariats need to
have preference affinity. Third, the benefits of collusion must outweigh the
risks of reputation loss for the secretariat. 
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To show the plausibility of the theory, and to give examples of how col-
lusion may work in practice, in this article I provide insights from two case
studies: the NATO operation in Libya in 2011 and the EU operation in Chad
in 2008. The field of security is widely considered a least likely area for sec-
retariat authority, as the member states are wary about sovereignty costs. The
NATO international staff and the EU’s Directorates on the Common Security
and Defence Policy (CSDP) are nonetheless serious bureaus.31 While short on
formal powers, they have considerable content and procedural expertise. This
means that the first condition is met. In both cases, the member states dis-
agreed on intervention. This makes it relatively easy to identify preference
affinity, which is the second condition. Finally, the potential gains from collu-
sion were significant and trumped the potential loss of reputation, which sat-
isfies the third condition. In the case studies, I discuss these three conditions
and identify instances of collusion in the different phases of the policy process.
The NATO Operation in Libya
At the end of 2010 protests broke out in what became known as the Arab
Spring. Several protests escalated such as in Libya where security forces used
live ammunition. By late February 2011, the government of Colonel Muam-
mar Qaddafi deployed military force to retake the eastern city of Benghazi.
The international community acted quickly. The UN Security Council adopted
Resolution 1973 on 17 March authorizing military intervention. This resolu-
tion was given effect two days later, when an ad hoc coalition of France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States started carrying out air strikes. On 31
March, military authority was transferred to NATO. Shortly after Qaddafi’s
death, NATO terminated its operation on 31 October 2011. This case study an-
alyzes NATO planning during March 2011. It focuses on how NATO secretary
general Anders Fogh Rasmussen and his officials in the international staff used
their authority to the advantage of pro-interventionist allies.
It is first important to establish that the NATO secretary general and his
officials are serious actors with complementary resources. NATO is often seen
as an intergovernmental alliance where consensus rules and the United States
acts as the primus inter pares.32 The authority of NATO officials is significant
nonetheless. First, they are the permanent chairpersons of the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) and its committees. This involves procedural powers, such as
agenda-setting, but also a role as a broker.33 Second, the international staff act
as a gatekeeper between the member states and the military command struc-
ture. Third, as a former prime minister, Rasmussen had some personal author-
ity and networks, which most national ambassadors lacked.34 He also acted as
the spokesperson of the alliance.
Moving toward the second condition, the NATO intervention was an ex-
ample of divided member states. The United States and the United Kingdom
favored the transfer of authority from the ad hoc coalition to NATO. This
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would relieve the United States from a command burden. France, on the other
hand, was hesitant to use NATO. It feared that NATO would constrain the op-
eration and limit its own role. Germany had infamously abstained from Reso-
lution 1973 and was not supportive of a NATO role. Turkey was against a
NATO mission in the Arab neighborhood while Poland and many Central and
Eastern European states did not want to commit troops.35
The position of the NATO secretary general and the international staff was
therefore critical. While Rasmussen initially avoided the spotlight, he quickly be-
came a supporter of NATO involvement. It was in his institutional interest. He
saw it as a good opportunity to show the relevance of NATO beyond Afghanistan.
There was thus preference affinity between some allies and the international staff.
Yet Rasmussen and his officials did not sheepishly follow the pro-interventionist
allies. They stressed that NATO had to bring added value to the operation36 and
that NATO had to stay within the UN Security Council mandate.37 As such, their
preferences were more restrictive than those of some allies.38 Despite the align-
ment, Rasmussen and his officials therefore pursued their own preferences.
To obtain an insight of how collusion was organized, it is important to
analyze NATO planning. This provides a better understanding of the third
condition—the trade-off between the benefits of collusion for the secretariat
and the risks of choosing sides. While the allies debated the NATO transfer
during the second half of March, a lot of informal planning had already been
done with a strong informal involvement of the NATO agents. By late Febru-
ary, the NATO military authorities started “prudent planning.” On 4−10
March, Rasmussen convened the NAC almost on a daily basis. On 10 March,
NATO initiated formal planning. Indeed, military planning was carried out be-
fore the member states settled their own differences. NATO officials not only
sat at the negotiation table; they also chaired the negotiations, pushed the plan-
ning, and kept the momentum going. 
The first step was to get the situation in Libya on the agenda. France ob-
jected to discussing Libya. Yet when the situation deteriorated, Rasmussen
used his procedural powers to convene an NAC emergency meeting on 25
February.39 Shortly afterward, the NAC instructed the Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to start prudent planning.40 Led by four-star
US admiral James Stavridis, this allowed SHAPE to write a nonpaper about
the no-fly zone, which would become the cornerstone of the mission.41 NATO
deployed AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft on 8
March to provide surveillance42 and increased its maritime presence. It also
launched planning on humanitarian assistance and an arms embargo on 10
March. While largely sideshows, this gave the ambassadors something to talk
about. The United States was the main driver. As one interviewee states, “The
idea is to push the planning . . . [t]he objective was to have NAC meetings and
to start the planning.”43 Rasmussen facilitated this process by using his proce-
dural powers. This is complementary authority, which can be used to support
like-minded member states during agenda setting. 
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The real bone of contention was the no-fly zone. Establishing a no-fly
zone would require a serious military engagement. NATO first had to take out
Libya’s air defenses.44 Maintaining a no-fly zone would also be costly. Previ-
ous experience had shown that a no-fly zone in and of itself would not end the
civil war.45 The no-fly zone was extensively debated. Prudent planning for a
no-fly zone started at the end of February, but it long remained unclear
whether there would be sufficient political will to launch the mission. The UN
Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 on 17 March. Only on 15 March
had US president Barack Obama come out in favor.46 Resolution 1973, how-
ever, not only imposed a no-fly zone, but also authorized “all necessary meas-
ures” to protect civilians.47 While the most controversial point, it was a
last-minute addition in a response to the developing situation. As such, it re-
ceived far less attention.
On 19 March, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that he had unilater-
ally authorized air strikes. The United States and the United Kingdom joined
the same day. These countries made up the core of the ad hoc coalition. Coali-
tion operations were coordinated by the United States through United States
Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the command ship USS Mount Whitney.
Various NATO officers were included in the coalition.48 Rear Admiral Russ
Harding came, for instance, from NATO. Stavridis was involved in the coali-
tion, as he also directed US European Command supporting AFRICOM. Once
NATO took over authority, many officials moved back.49 That staff was tem-
porarily exchanged is evidence of the close cooperation among France, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and NATO authorities.
Almost immediately after the launch of the coalition operations, it became
clear that the ad hoc command structure was not workable.50 While the United
States had previously acted as a framework nation for coalition operations,51
it noted, on day three, that it did not want to be responsible this time around.52
The United Kingdom also called for NATO to take over from the coalition.
Prime Minister David Cameron stated that the coalition is “operating under
U.S. command with the intention that this will transfer to NATO . . . [c]learly
the mission would benefit from that and from using NATO’s tried-and-tested
machinery in command and control.”53
Understanding that this could be a good opportunity for NATO, the sec-
retary general and his staff played a role. As the go-between for the member
states and the military command structure, they put tremendous pressure on
SHAPE to get the planning done quickly.54 As a result, SHAPE “sent 80%” of
the Operations Plan.55 SHAPE furthermore sent the Operation Plan rather late
to put extra pressure on the member states.56 A procedural trick by NATO of-
ficials was also the use of silence procedures with short deadlines. This put ob-
structive member states on the spot.57 The NATO secretariat in close
cooperation with the US leadership at SHAPE thus used its authority to the ad-
vantage of pro-interventionist allies.
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Negotiations over NATO involvement reached a critical stage during the
week of 21 March. It started off with Rasmussen insisting on the use of NATO
and the French and German ambassadors walking out of the room.58 While
this shows the limits of Rasmussen’s authority and the risk of being perceived
as biased, it also usefully put everyone under pressure. The next day, the am-
bassadors reconvened and managed to find agreement on the no-fly zone.
They continued to disagree, however, on strike actions. Turkey insisted that all
military operations would come under NATO. It would then have a say and the
ability to restrict strike actions. France, meanwhile, wanted to keep NATO
away from the strike actions.59 On 24 March, France finally gave in following
US pressure.60 The transfer of authority from the coalition to NATO took place
a week later.
When looking at the NATO intervention in Libya, there are several con-
clusions. First, it makes little sense to dichotomize between allies and the sec-
retariat. NATO agents did not wait with their planning until the allies had
reached an agreement. Indeed, they tried to affect the political decision. They
did so against the wishes of some member states. Rasmussen became a sup-
porter of a NATO mission. This was about institutional interests. He used his
procedural power to convene meetings, speed up the planning, and put pres-
sure on the NATO system and he pleaded for a political agreement. While
there were limits to the authority of the NATO secretary general and his staff,
this was significant nonetheless.
Second, the preferences of Rasmussen and his staff were aligned with
those of the United States and the United Kingdom. The United States and the
United Kingdom benefited from Rasmussen exerting his authority. Rasmussen
was not just sitting at the table waiting for his instructions. He chaired the NAC
and used his delegated and expert authority. Third, while it is difficult to trace
informal meetings between member states and secretariats, it is worth pointing
at the triangle of the US ambassador, NATO secretary general Rasmussen, and
Stavridis at SHAPE. Stavridis notes that “my diplomatic ‘wing man,’ U.S. Am-
bassador to NATO Ivo Daalder, did the political side of this, and we talked a
couple of times a week to keep in sync.”61 The exchange of staff between
NATO and the coalition is further evidence of collusion. The risk of being per-
ceived as biased became a concern secondary to launching the mission.
The EU Operation in Chad
The EU military intervention in Chad and the Central African Republic re-
sulted from a desire to do something about the situation in Darfur in neigh-
boring Sudan. Since the beginning of the conflict in Darfur in 2003, about
250,000 refugees had left for eastern Chad. To improve the situation in the
refugee camps, the UN suggested a multidimensional presence consisting of
military, police, and humanitarian workers. The Chadian president, Idriss
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Déby, however, made clear that the UN military component would not be wel-
come.62 As a compromise, the EU sent instead a military mission of 3,700
troops for a period of one year.63 Afterward, the UN took over. President Déby
could accept a French-led EU mission, as France also bilaterally guaranteed the
stability of his regime. 
This case study analyzes the EU planning process in 2007. It focuses on
how EU officials used their procedural authority to the advantage of France.
As with the case of NATO, and in line with the first condition, it is important
to establish that the EU officials in the CSDP Directorates were serious actors
with significant resources. Three sources of authority can be identified. First,
while EU officials did not chair the meetings at the time, they had a consider-
able authority over the rotating presidency in agenda management.64 Second,
the CSDP Directorates are in charge of drafting strategic planning documents
for which they have considerable expertise.65 Third, the EU high representa-
tive at the time, Javier Solana, had personal authority and international net-
works.66 As such, EU officials are useful allies for member states.
With respect to the second condition, the EU intervention in Chad was
another example of divided member states. France was a proponent. Darfur
had featured prominently in the 2007 elections and was a priority for Presi-
dent Sarkozy and Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner.67 Most other member
states were skeptical. The United Kingdom noted its commitments elsewhere.
Germany was wary of using force in Africa. It was generally felt “that how-
ever well intentioned the operation, in the end it would serve French interests
the most.”68 Solana and his officials had pro-interventionist preferences.69
They considered that EU security policy could be further developed. Their
preferences were thus aligned with those of France.70 For EU officials, how-
ever, it was important that the operation would be realistic. Dealing directly
with Darfur was considered a nonstarter. They preferred an operation in Chad
in support of the efforts of the UN.71 As such, French and EU preferences
were not fully aligned.
Despite significant opposition, France in collusion with EU officials
launched this operation. They worked together from the beginning, cooperation
that was facilitated by the large number of French nationals in the EU planning
services. France ended up carrying a large part of the burden of the eventual
military mission, but the interaction with EU officials provides an instance of
the theory.
For France, it was beneficial to work closely with the EU officials not just
for their procedural expertise. Proposals coming out of Brussels were regarded as
less biased than ideas from Paris. The blessing by the EU officials was important
for other states, such as Ireland, which provided the operations commander. 
To analyze the trade-offs between the benefits from collusion and the risk
of being perceived as biased, it is necessary to trace the planning process. The
EU operation came on the agenda after the French elections. Kouchner di-
rectly convened a meeting and sent a telegram to the EU partners requesting
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an options paper.72 Without the knowledge of the other member states, EU of-
ficials were also invited to the French military headquarters in Paris.73 If
France was to do anything, it would have a natural ally in the EU officials.74
The EU Directorate for Defence Issues was furthermore, at the time, a French
fiefdom led by Claude-France Arnould. Following this meeting, Kouchner met
with Déby on 10 June. UN sources report that Déby agreed “to the deployment
of an international military presence in eastern Chad composed of French and
other European Union forces.”75 They also state that “a United Nations mili-
tary presence was not favoured by the Chadian Government, although it could
eventually be discussed as a second phase of a United Nations deployment.”76
The process started moving in the EU with an options paper on 13 July 2007.
For the EU officials, it was an opportunity to “[kill] the stupid ideas.”77 All ideas
for EU action in Darfur lacked support from the local government and the hu-
manitarian community.78 The only thing remaining for the EU was to “close the
two backdoors in order to avoid spillover in Chad and the Central African Re-
public.”79 The options paper marked the start of the planning process that would
eventually lead to political agreement on 15 October. It is tracing the process, as
it shows how different tricks were employed. Furthermore, a discussion of the
planning process shows that political agreement came after the planning.
At the end of August, EU officials went on a fact-finding mission to the
region.80 Based on their findings, they presented a Crisis Management Con-
cept. It was adopted on 12 September. The concept described the overall pa-
rameters of the EU’s possible involvement. The next step in the process was
to get UN Security Council authorization. There were two competing agendas.
For the EU, it had to be clear that the UN would take over after one year. The
Chadian government, however, remained reluctant to host UN peacekeepers.
Getting clarity about the handover would lead to delays. France pushed for a
compromise: to postpone the decision on the handover until the EU mid-mandate
review. While this created ambiguity, it allowed France and the EU officials to
move ahead with planning.81
The member states then discussed the Military Strategic Options. EU offi-
cials presented the member states with four options.82 These options were
drafted in a way that only option three was realistic. It would involve the de-
ployment of four battalions before the start of the rainy season. The other options
were either too light, geographically unappealing, or required deployment dur-
ing the rainy season. After the member states chose indeed option three, plan-
ning was only a matter of legalizing all the decisions in a political agreement. It
soon turned out, however, that the EU officials had underestimated the common
costs. The common costs, borne by all member states, increased in the weeks
after the adoption of the options. While EU officials had a formal excuse—the
budgets for the options were preliminary—it is difficult to escape the impression
that this was an instance of an exploited information advantage. 
While agreement was reached, it became clear that few member states ac-
tually wanted to contribute. Since Germany and the United Kingdom were not
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in favor of the operation, France would be the only big state providing troops.
This meant that France would potentially have to pay for almost the whole op-
eration. To reduce its burden, France looked for contributions from the other
states. This proved difficult. One reason why the member states were reluctant
was the perception of French bias. The EU could make a meaningful contri-
bution, but it would have to be an impartial actor in Chadian politics. Yet due
to French bilateral support to the local government, few member states saw
how this was going to happen. Various member states were, however, enthu-
siastic about the EU mission being part of a broader multidimensional pres-
ence supporting UN activities. Furthermore, the concept of a bridging
operation was appealing.83
France started to lobby intensively for military contributions at the high-
est political level. It convinced Ireland to take the operational command and it
also solicited a sizable contribution from Poland. Only after both countries
made these contributions could the member states move forward. A shortfall,
however, remained in terms of military enablers. The Irish commander noted
that “it was not a luxury plan.”84
France took a leadership role in the EU mission, but it worked closely to-
gether with the EU officials. Rather than first seeking an agreement with the
other member states, as the collective principal model suggests, France invited
EU officials directly to its military planning headquarters. During the summer,
France and the EU officials worked closely on the initial planning documents.
Such cooperation was facilitated by the presence of French nationals in the EU
planning services. As with the case of the NATO intervention, it is difficult to
trace the precise information flows between France and these EU officials. Yet
it is clear that planning documents were discussed between France and the EU
officials before they were made available to the other member states. 
Finally, it is worth saying something about the motives for collusion. France
wanted an EU mission. Working together with the EU officials was a clear step
to signal its intentions to the rest of the membership. It also knew it would have
a strong ally in the EU officials in terms of the use of procedures. Making use
of the authority of the EU officials was thus beneficial for France. For the EU
officials, this also was a good opportunity to launch a new EU military opera-
tion. As they were building up EU security policy, they had an interest in the
mission. The EU officials went out of their way to facilitate the French agenda.
Conclusion
Like-minded states often work together in international organizations. Like-
minded states and secretariats do the same. For individual or groups of states to
achieve anything, they often require the support of secretariats. As the masters
of the procedures and informal veto players, secretariats are useful allies. Sec-
retariats themselves hardly ever possess the authority to pursue policy on their
own or, let alone, against the wishes of the major states. They need backing as
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well. As the term suggests, collusion in international organizations between
states and secretariats is often informal. Secretariats are formally impartial
agents and cannot be seen as siding with part of the membership. If they are
perceived as biased, they will lose some of their authority. And yet collusion
can be extensive, rather explicit, and involve the exchange of resources.
While this argument seems straightforward, the theoretical literature has
hardly paid attention to the strategic interaction between states and secretari-
ats. Much of the constructivist literature focuses on the authority of secretari-
ats beyond states. Principal-agent models are concerned with conflict between
principals and agents. They consider agency loss to be the difference between
what the member states collectively decide and the policy implemented by the
secretariat. This ignores the possibility that individual states may well benefit
from secretariat authority. The informal governance literature addresses uni-
lateral control, but reduces the authority of secretariats to a continuation of
state power by other means.
In this article, I have provided empirical insights from two case studies. A
generalization of these findings should be treated with caution, particularly
when it concerns the wider and rather varied population of international or-
ganizations. A generalization would require additional empirical analysis. Yet
it is worth pointing out several similarities in the two case studies. In both
cases, it is evident that substantial military planning took place long before the
member states reached an agreement. This puts the conventional collective
principal perspective upside-down. The member states did not go into con-
clave to reach agreement first. Instead, the secretariats worked with like-
minded states to get the planning ready, putting opposing states in front of a
fait accompli. For states to block political agreement late in the game required
them to challenge strong states such as the United States and France. The early
involvement of secretariats was therefore significant. 
Also interesting is the considerable interaction between the states and sec-
retariats through the exchange of personnel. While SHAPE constitutes the
source of NATO’s military expertise, it is US led. One can make a similar ob-
servation for the EU mission. The strong French presence in the EU planning
directorate made informal relations easier. Mareike Kleine has written about
the national fiefdoms in international organizations.85 While she is certainly
right that this presents a case of unilateral control, it is also important to con-
clude that fiefdoms facilitate collusion between states and secretariats. Fur-
thermore, while US and French leadership in NATO and EU security is clearly
significant, there tend to be fiefdoms, secondments, and political appointees
across international secretariats more broadly. 
There are also limits to using the authority of secretariats. In both cases,
opposing member states could be pressured into accepting the launch of a mil-
itary operation. They could not be pressured into making actual military con-
tributions. This was naturally a source of frustration for the United States and
France, but at an analytical level it points to the limits of the authority of sec-
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retariats. Furthermore, secretariats need to permanently consider their reputa-
tion, which creates an obstacle for them to collude with states. This dilemma
was captured in the third condition: the gains from collusion need to be sig-
nificant for the secretariat to risk its reputation.  
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